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THE U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY 
AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY
IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
Scott A. Field and Dariush Zahedi*
 
Ever since the Iraq War disrupted the regional balance of power, a funda-
mentally new geopolitical reality has been emerging in the Middle East. As 
the U.S. winds down its military presence in Iraq, it must confront this new 
reality, and decide what kind of grand strategy it will henceforth apply to the 
region.  In this respect, the most promising development it can seize upon is 
the rapidly emerging role of Turkey as a leading regional political, economic 
and diplomatic power. As with any rising power, this process will generate 
occasional tensions with the United States, as seen recently over Iranian nu-
clear sanctions and the Israeli flotilla incident. But the United States should 
not lose sight of the overwhelming long-term advantages of Turkey’s greater 
prominence in the Middle East, which is likely to facilitate integration with the 
global economy, support peaceful modes of conflict resolution and encour-
age accommodation between Islamic and Western liberal political norms. 
* Scott A. Field is lecturer in National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey and a visiting fellow at the Institute of Inter-
national Studies, University of California Berkeley. Dariush Zahedi is lecturer at the Department of Political Science at University of California.
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A New Geopolitical Reality
ollowing the demise of America’s two most recent approaches to 
managing the Middle East –the Bush Doctrine of regional transforma-
tion and the Clinton strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran– U.S. 
grand strategy in the region is adrift. The Bush Doctrine fell spectacu-
larly at the first hurdle with the failure to stabilize Iraq and transform it 
into a U.S. client. The notion of intimidating the region’s rejectionists into submis-
sion using on-ground displays of military power has been an unequivocal failure. 
This is nowhere better illustrated today than in Damascus, where Bashar al-Assad 
–by this time supposed to either have surrendered or been swept from power– is 
keeping a diary full of diplomatic appointments– and Tehran, where the regime rel-
ishes the opportunity to herald its unrelenting pursuit of mastery over the nuclear 
fuel cycle.
As it collapsed, the Bush Doctrine also put to rest any chance of returning to 
Clinton’s policy of dual containment. The border between Iran and Iraq used to be 
the Middle East’s version of an iron curtain, dividing the power centers of the Shia 
Persian world and the Sunni Arab world. This convenient fulcrum allowed Reagan 
and Bush 41 to play Iran and Iraq against each other in a strategy of balancing; 
and later reassured Clinton that his policy of seeking to isolate and transform both 
nations into feeble regional actors would not end up pushing them together into 
a rogue axis.
That iron curtain no longer exists. The moment Saddam’s regime fell, a wave of 
exiled political leaders and militias, military and intelligence agents, pilgrims and 
businessmen from Iran flooded into Iraq and generated a dense network of po-
litical, military, cultural and economic linkages across the now-porous border. By 
the time the U.S. awoke to the fact that it had blundered into a deadly vortex of 
insurgency, civil war, terrorism and state failure, Iran had effectively sunk its claws 
into Iraq. It gleefully accepted the extraordinary geopolitical gift of the U.S. us-
ing its military power to sponsor the creation of the world’s first Shia Arab state. 
Overnight its degree of influence inside its erstwhile enemy expanded by orders 
of magnitude, giving it a bridgehead into the Arab world, one that it could never 
have forged alone.
Thus through a border that was once a brick wall, Iran now enjoys a gateway to 
influence in the Arab world. This is not to say that Iraq is an Iranian client state, or 
that it ever will be; Iraqi nationalism is too fierce and deeply embedded for that, 
whatever the newfound Shia sense of fraternity. But the significance of the reversal 
from bitter enmity to cautious friendship between Iran and Iraq cannot be over-
emphasized; it is the single most significant geopolitical change wrought from the 
Iraq War, and the defining feature of the “new Middle East” towards which the U.S. 





Most significantly, this turnaround has rendered the containment of Iran extremely 
difficult. Aware of Iran’s greater reach and rising influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories as well as the unabated quest 
on the part of the Islamic Republic for nuclear capability, America’s Gulf allies are 
clearly apprehensive about the rise of Iran. So much so, in fact, that some Sunni 
Arab leaders may even privately welcome bombing raids on the part of Israel and-
or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear and military installations. The more enlightened 
and far-sighted leaders recognize, however, that such strikes will only present a 
temporary setback to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, unify Iranians behind their increas-
ingly unpopular regime, bring about the unraveling of Iran’s potentially formidable 
opposition movement, and prompt the country to leave the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) and weaponize its nuclear program in short order. Moreover, 
with American naval and military bases scattered throughout their coastlines and 
territories, the hereditary rulers of Persian Gulf sheikhdoms recognize that they 
could easily get caught in the crossfire between Iran and the U.S., should the Is-
lamic Republic’s radicalized military chiefs decide to retaliate against the interests 
of the U.S. and its allies. 
The Gulf states, therefore, have sought to establish a modus vivendi with Iran, rec-
ognizing that the Iraq War has made greater Iranian influence a permanent political 
feature of the new Middle East. They would be prepared to directly confront Iran 
only in an extreme situation, for example if Iran were to emulate Saddam Hussein’s 
military adventurism and directly threaten their survival. This is an eventuality the 
U.S. must reaffirm an unswerving commitment to guard against; but given the 
regional gains Iran can continue to reap without firing a shot, it is also a rather 
remote one.
The quest for influence in the new Iraq and the new Middle East is thus primarily 
a diplomatic game. The most pressing task facing the U.S. is to use its diplomatic 
resources within Iraq and the rest of the region to rebuild its battered reputation 
and flagging influence, and thus regain some of the ground the Iraq War surren-
dered to Iran. This will not be easy; Iran, and other regional actors such as Tur-
key, which has also vastly extended its influence inside Iraq since the war, enjoys 
great natural advantages through their historical and cultural ties, superior ability 
to navigate local politics and the capability to wield influence through local proxies. 
Indeed, the ability of Turkey and especially Iran to influence developments inside 
Iraq is likely to become further enhanced in the aftermath of the impending depar-
ture of American combat troops from Iraq.
There is also no escaping the fact that one of the key consequences of introducing 
democracy to the country has been to reduce the U.S. to just one of many play-
ers competing for influence within Iraq’s new political arena. It will out-compete 
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its rivals only to the extent it manages to establish a reputation for pursuing its 
interests with sensitivity and respect for local concerns, and fostering security and 
prosperity for ordinary Iraqis. As the shoe-throwing climax of the SOFA negotia-
tion well illustrated, however, this will be a thankless and Sisyphean task, requir-
ing every ounce of the diplomatic resources that can be packed into the world’s 
largest embassy. But the future standing and influence of the U.S. in the region 
depend critically upon it.
This standing and influence will also continue to depend on the U.S. disposition 
towards the issue that 99 percent of respondents to a recent survey of the Arab 
world place in their top five priorities: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Obama 
administration is already preparing the ground for taking important steps with re-
gard to the Arab Israeli conflict in order to repair America’s tattered reputation in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds. The president has adamantly refused Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on the necessity of solving Iran’s nuclear im-
passe prior to focusing on the festering Palestinian problem, maintaining instead 
that they should be pursued in tandem. The president appears to believe that one 
of the most effective means for rehabilitating the image of the U.S., undercutting 
the influence of Iran and its proxies, and undermining support for al-Qaeda brand 
terrorism is the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Demonstrating his commit-
ment to this objective, he has publicly rebuked the Israeli government for its policy 
of expanding settlements in East Jerusalem, and, significantly, appears to have 
embraced General David Petraeus’ assertion that the absence of progress to-
wards the resolution of the Arab Israeli dispute contributes to the undermining of 
the safety and security of American servicemen stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
To underscore the point that a key component in the fight against extremism and 
terrorism is the removal of the conditions that fuel it, and in sharp departure from 
all of his predecessors, President Obama has even gone so far as to refer to the 
resolution of the Arab Israeli dispute as being vital to the national security interest 
of the U.S.
A New (Old) Strategy: Offshore Balancing
President Obama has correctly identified the resolution of the long festering Israeli 
Palestinian problem as a key factor in enhancing America’s ability to promote its 
interests in the area. This, however, is a monumental task, with multiple dimen-
sions, over which the U.S. can exert only limited control. In light of such limita-
tions, what other steps can the U.S. take, and what is the best grand strategy for 






The first principle should be to recognize that having large numbers of American 
troops active in the region is counterproductive. U.S. troops on Arabian soil put 
the early wind in Al Qaeda’s sails, and will continue to hand extremists a recruiting 
tool for so long as they remain. Hous-
ing large numbers of U.S. troops with 
solid allies like Japan is uncomfortable 
enough, as recent events in Okinawa 
demonstrate. In the Middle East it is 
far more problematic, and if pursued 
would breed a steady deterioration in 
the relationship between the U.S. mili-
tary and local communities. The con-
stant risk and eventual statistical cer-
tainty of cultural transgressions by U.S. 
personnel mean that resentment and 
tension among local communities are 
bound to increase over time. The U.S. 
should resist the temptation to do any-
thing more than retain sufficient troops 
in Iraq and Kuwait to deter an outbreak 
of ethnic or sectarian violence while the 
new Iraqi government is being formed and stabilized. Beyond the modest num-
bers currently stationed in Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the logis-
tical advantages in rapid deployment gained by having large numbers of troops in 
the region are outweighed by the costs, at a moment when the U.S. is best served 
by keeping a low military profile.
The U.S. must, to be sure, reaffirm an unequivocal commitment to the security 
of the Persian Gulf, its primary and enduring national interest in the region, as set 
out in the Carter Doctrine 30 years ago. But this can be comfortably achieved 
without large numbers of troops on the ground; the firepower projected by having 
two or three carrier strike groups in or close by the region is ample to deter any 
adventurism by regional actors. It should be remembered that the key threat to 
U.S. interests, namely a closure of the Straits of Hormuz, would be equally if not 
more detrimental to Iran, and is consequently unlikely. The other key security chal-
lenge, keeping pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, is also not advanced by 
a large U.S. troop presence; Iran knows full well that the U.S. is not in any position 
to contemplate a land invasion. At the same time, the U.S. troop presence in Iran’s 
near abroad undermines anti-nuclear efforts by giving the Iranian regime a pretext 
for domestic fear mongering that bolsters internal support for the nuclear program. 
The other conceivable scenario, in which unilateral Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear 
facilities draw the U.S. into a conflict, would also involve not ground forces but 
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rather bombing sorties and missile strikes, which again falls within the domain of 
the U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups. U.S. ground troops could contribute nothing 
to this effort, and indeed would be a liability by simply providing a target for Iranian 
retaliation.
In short, U.S. regional security strategy 
should revert to “offshore balancing”: 
leaving the lightest possible footprint on 
the ground, while reaffirming the Carter 
Doctrine and its solid commitment to 
protect regional allies and swiftly re-
versing any military aggression that 
threatens the flow of Persian Gulf oil. 
This would reduce financial burdens, 
minimize the risks to U.S. personnel, 
deprive extremists of a recruiting tool 
and Iran of a pretext for weaponizing its 
nuclear program, while still comfortably 
meeting U.S. security commitments in 
the region. It would also free U.S. dip-
lomats to focus on the real task at hand 
for the U.S. in the Middle East: rebuilding its diplomatic influence and constructing 
a security architecture that stabilizes the region and sets it on the path to eco-
nomic prosperity and political liberalization.
The Critical Role of Turkey in the New Middle East
One legacy of the Iraq War is that the Middle East is now balanced uncomfortably 
between two worlds: the old bargain struck by the U.S., of tolerating repressive 
autocrats as long as they provided stability; and the new vision of the Bush Doc-
trine, in which democracy and free markets would transform the region’s rejec-
tionism and economic despair into global integration, prosperity, as well as socio-
political openness and pluralism. Whatever the failures of the Iraq War, one of its 
fragile achievements has been to open a window of opportunity for Iraq to begin 
moving itself, and the region, toward the more propitious of these two options. Of 
course, backsliding towards a more humane version of Saddam-style autocracy 
dominated by a sectarian elite remains a distinct possibility, as does reversion to 
prolonged Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict, this time accompanied by an equally dev-
astating ethnic bloodbath between Kurds and Arabs. But the U.S. needs to do all 
it can to nudge Iraq and the region in the opposite direction. To do so it will need 
to stabilize Iraq politically and economically, and work to consolidate and spread 
its gains regionally. This, in return requires a concerted effort to finally build for the 
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Middle East a coherent and effective regional security architecture. In this task, 
one regional partner stands head and shoulders above all others in its importance: 
Turkey.
Turkey possesses a number of unique qualities that make it indispensable to the 
United States as a partner for pursuing its interests in the Middle East. It is 99 
percent Muslim and is currently ruled by a political party with Islamist roots (the 
Justice and Development Party - AKP); but remains a fiercely secular democracy. 
It has warm relations with all Arab states of the region as well as Iran; but also 
maintains (if increasingly tenuously) a military alliance with Israel. Its cultural roots 
lie in Central Asia and the Middle East; yet it has been a staunch Western ally in 
NATO for six decades and a longtime candidate for EU membership. Turkey thus 
bridges all the cultural and political divides that make it difficult for the U.S. to 
operate in the Middle East. Its influence is currently being welcomed by the Arab 
states as a moderate counterweight to Iran inside Iraq and throughout the region. 
It also has clout; it possesses one of the largest militaries in NATO and is a major 
economic power, as recognized in its membership of the G-20. Most significant of 
all, the primary foreign policy focus of its current government is to deepen its po-
litical and economic engagement across the Middle East. Of all the countries cur-
rently seeking to exploit the regional vacuum created by the Iraq War, in the long 
term Turkey is easily the best placed to succeed. Ten years hence if any country 
is likely to have greatly increased its economic and political influence as well as its 
soft power across the region, it will be Turkey. The U.S. would be well advised to 
ride on its coat-tails.
The essence of what Turkey has to offer the U.S. in the Middle East is embodied in 
the narrative of its immediate past and how it has, especially since the ascendency 
of the AKP in 2002, been attempting to reconcile the conflicting forces that have 
bedeviled the Middle East since the region’s encounter with European modernity, 
namely secularism, Islam, democracy and economic development. In the 1980s it 
undertook IMF-mandated economic reforms that lifted it out of chronic economic 
and political instability, powered by the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class. This 
bourgeoisie was made up of predominantly conservative Anatolian Muslims, who 
formed the constituency that brought the AKP to power in 2002, and gave them 
an even more sweeping mandate in 2007. The secularist and military elite thus 
disenfranchised (which had hitherto arrogated onto itself a monopoly on the com-
prehension, interpretation and enforcement of the legacy of Ataturk, the founder 
of the Turkish Republic) have pushed back strongly against the alleged threat 
to secularism and democracy posed by the AKP’s Islamist leanings, but found 
themselves outflanked by the AKP’s stronger economic credentials and robust 
commitment to the human rights and political reform requirements set down by 
the EU. Western values are no longer abstract; they are made concrete by the 
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Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU. In pursuit of the political high ground 
they represent, the AKP has labored to make civil liberties, minority rights for the 
Kurdish population, civilian control of the military, and development of the free 
market embedded features of Turkish political life.1
In short, a Muslim political party has come to power democratically on the back 
of a rising Muslim middle class engaged with the international economy and by 
promoting Western values. This is precisely the model promoted in the lofty rheto-
ric of the Bush Freedom Agenda, but which the U.S. so conspicuously had no 
actual capacity to produce. Turkey is both willing and able to promote this model 
throughout the Middle East, and the U.S. should back it strongly in doing so.
Where Turkey is most vital to regional order is in Iraq. Although it suffered eco-
nomically from the first Iraq War, and due to PKK terrorism after second, it has 
now turned the politically troubling emergence of a strong Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) into an economic opportunity. In 2009 Turkish companies and 
businessmen, many of them aligned with the AK Party and the faith based Gülen 
Movement, conducted 12 billion dollars worth of business with the KRG; in 2010 
that figure is projected to rise to 20 billion dollars. The lure of economic prosperity 
thus generated provides the best hope for weaning the KRG away from its temp-
tation to fight for Kirkuk and other disputed territories it seized in 2003, and to curb 
its dangerous ambitions to declare independence.
The KRG has long been the success story of Iraq, and the best way to consolidate 
it is to convince the Kurds that they will be better off by compromising with the 
Arabs on disputed territories, reining in the PKK and pursuing a brighter economic 
future in the Turkish orbit. Adding to the economic incentives Turkey is already 
providing, the AKP has also risked substantial political capital in a bold initiative to 
reconcile with Turkey’s own Kurdish population and thus take the wind out of the 
separatists’ sails. In November 2009, the AKP government announced it would 
take a dramatic step towards political normalization with the KRG by opening a 
consulate in Erbil. It is entirely in the U.S. interest and the interests of regional sta-
bility that such initiatives succeed.
Turkey is also pursuing political and economic engagement elsewhere in Iraq 
and the region. It played a central role in crucial political negotiations such as the 
SOFA, and more recently the legal framework for upcoming national elections. It 
has mediated peace talks between Israel and Syria, and was involved in negotiations 
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in Doha that halted the slide towards civil war in Lebanon in May 2008. In October 
last year it dispatched ministers to Baghdad to sign a package of 48 coopera-
tion deals with Iraq, a feat replicated in Damascus around the same time. It has 
clinched free trade deals with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel, is seeking one 
with the GCC and its exports into the region are now set to swell even further 
beyond the 31 billion dollars achieved in 2008. It already plays a pivotal role in 
regional energy security, acting as a transit state for oil and gas from Iraq, Iran and 
Azerbaijan to European markets, and the proposed Nabucco pipeline could bring 
further countries into the loop. All this has generated tremendous momentum be-
hind Turkey’s push into the region, which promises to turn the attention of regional 
actors from conflict to commerce and diplomatic resolution of disputes, and thus 
act as a stabilizing force for the future. In a region that has an average 60 percent 
of the population under 30, with huge and growing unemployment problems as 
well as numerous unresolved territorial, ethnic, nationalist, ideological, and political 
disputes, it comes not a moment too soon.
Despite the many positives Turkey brings to the table, its growing influence is not 
welcomed in some quarters in Washington. Common complaints include that its 
government has Islamist leanings, is too close to Iran and Syria, and has increas-
ingly strained relations with America’s close ally Israel. These facts do introduce 
some tension into the relationship, and inevitably create some distance. But the 
fact is that if the U.S. wishes to make any headway in the Middle East, such dis-
tance is precisely what it needs in a regional partner. In a region where suspicion of 
American motives is endemic, willingness to work with a partner that has an inde-
pendent foreign policy accurately tuned to the broad moderate majority of Middle 
Eastern opinion (for whom the factors listed above are as much virtues as vices) 
is the best way to regain credibility. It is infinitely harder for conspiracy theorists on 
the Arab street to argue that a Turkey led by the AKP, with its Islamist roots and 
democratic credentials, is simply a stooge promoting U.S. imperial designs.
If the U.S. wants to work with clients that reinforce the rut of anti-Americanism and 
violent extremism that its partnerships with Arab autocrats and uncritical support 
of Israel have dug for it over the past 40 years, it can simply revert to its previous 
patterns of engagement. If, however, it would like an interlocutor that is a dynamic 
rising power capable of spreading prosperity to every corner of the region, demon-
strating the concrete benefits of international economic engagement and project-
ing Western democratic values as it does so, then Turkey would be the partner of 
choice. It reaches across the region’s barriers and offers an actual working model 
for a way out of the Arab (and Middle Eastern) predicament, a task that Iran’s 
Shia makeup and revolutionary zeal disqualifies it from, Israel’s inability to resolve 
its conflict with the Palestinians prevent it from addressing, and which is simply 
beyond the reach of the sclerotic Arab autocracies.
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In the aftermath of the failure of President George W. Bush’s attempts at spread-
ing socio-political openness as well as economic liberalization and integration to 
the Middle East through coercive means, President Obama’s yearning to revert to 
the more familiar principle of realpolitik as the guiding principle of American foreign 
policy is understandable. However, the President would be well-advised not to 
abandon the strategic objective of prodding Middle Eastern nations to become 
more integrated into the global economy and finally starting a Fourth Wave of 
Democratization. A more prosperous, open, and economically integrated Mid-
dle East, capable of creating gainful employment for the massive army of young 
men and women poised to enter the region’s job market, would undermine the 
ability of extremists to gain new adherents and expand their social base. In other 
words, President Bush and his neo-conservative advisors were not incorrect in 
diagnosing the primary causes contributing to the economic deprivation and po-
litical underdevelopment of the Middle East. Indeed, a group of Arab intellectuals 
responsible for publishing the Arab Human Development Reports had come to a 
similar conclusion back in 2002. Where Bush and his advisors blundered was the 
selection of the means through which they sought to generate the desired trans-
formations.
By helping to open the closed and stagnant economies of Middle Eastern states 
(without infringing upon the principles of non-interference and sovereignty that are 
viewed as sacrosanct by Middle Eastern leaders), Turkey can contribute to the 
creation of the requisite conditions and constituencies that will, in the long run, 
pave the way for the transition to enduring democracies in the Middle East. Al-
though in the short term the bulk of the benefits of economic opening are likely to 
get concentrated in the hands of the entourage of the sheikhs and presidents-for-
life, such an opening can also spawn the creation of a bourgeoisie. History sug-
gests that this middle class, whose livelihood will be dependant upon the global 
economy, will shun extremist policies that endanger its economic interests, even 
as it paves the way for greater social and economic interaction with the outside 
world.
Turkey, then, can play an indispensable role in promoting a freedom and prosper-
ity agenda conducive both to the advancement of the interests of the people of the 
Middle East as well as the government of the U.S. However, the greatest obstacle 
to U.S.-Turkish cooperation is perhaps the catastrophic downturn in Turkish public 
opinion towards the U.S. that resulted from the Iraq War. In 2000 U.S. popularity in 
Turkey was above 50 percent, but by 2003 it had plummeted close to single digits 
and has barely moved since. More than 70 percent of Turks recently said that U.S. 
foreign policy plays a negative role in the world (more than Pakistan, Russia and 
China) and a galling 40 percent regard the U.S. as an enemy state (twice the num-





preaching the need for unity in fighting terrorism, its war to pre-empt a largely fab-
ricated threat in Iraq caused a tremendous upsurge in the very real threat posed 
to Turkey by the PKK. The hypocrisy of this stance was, unsurprisingly, not lost on 
the Turkish public. America’s unconditional support for virtually all of the policy de-
cisions of the Israeli government, particularly during the invasion of Gaza in 2008, 
also undermined the confidence of the Turkish public in the U.S. It was not until 
late 2008, with growing Turkish impatience and increasing cross-border military 
activity that the U.S. started taking a more pro-active role in addressing Turkish 
concerns and began to turn the problem around. That President Obama chose 
Turkey as the first port of call in his charm offensive towards the Muslim world 
suggests he grasps the significance of 
the issue; his speech there was a useful 
first step in what should now become 
an unrelenting diplomatic effort to re-
build Turkish public confidence in U.S. 
foreign policy and thus facilitate official 
U.S.-Turkish cooperation.
No step would be more useful in this 
regard than initiating a new regional se-
curity architecture for the Middle East, 
with Turkey in a leadership role. With 
Iran closing in on a nuclear capability, 
Israel threatening to attack it unilater-
ally, Hizbullah rearmed with more ad-
vanced weaponry and its cadres itch-
ing for the next round with Israel, and 
the Israeli-Palestinian problem festering 
on the brink of a Third Intifada, the prospect of a serious and coordinated outbreak 
of armed conflict across the region is real and growing. Now that the dust has set-
tled on the Bush Administration’s ill-fated attempt to solve the region’s problems 
by forceful transformation, a new and comprehensive regional approach is ur-
gently needed to push back against this trend. Rather than attempting to militarily 
dominate regional players into submission and impose a Pax Americana, the U.S. 
should instead seek to construct a framework within which all players in the region 
can engage in a realistic dialogue on the full range of their security and economic 
concerns. As Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual and Stephen Stedman have argued in 
their book Power and Responsibility, the parallel political, economic and security 
tracks successfully pursued through the OSCE in Europe could provide a model.2 
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With its ability to talk readily to all key players and offer them economic incentives 
in return for constructive actions, Turkey is the ideal interlocutor, peace-broker 
and catalyst. Both the EU and the U.S. could do much to revive their fortunes with 
the Turkish public –and more broadly in the Middle East– by backing its key role in 
a new regional security architecture.
Conclusion
Consumed with massive economic problems at home and a costly war abroad in 
Afghanistan, the U.S. urgently needs a new strategy for the Middle East that will 
stabilize the region and bring U.S. commitments back in line with its capabilities. 
The Iraq War demonstrated the folly of the U.S. attempting to micromanage and 
arbitrate local politics in the Middle East. It was militarily costly, economically ruin-
ous and politically counterproductive –but above all else simply unnecessary. As 
pointed out by John Mearsheimer, a prominent proponent of offshore balancing 
in the Middle East, the U.S. does not need to dominate the region militarily– it just 
needs to make sure that nobody else does.3  This can be comfortably achieved 
with a strategy of offshore balancing that leaves a minimal footprint on the ground 
and thus dampens its terrorist problems at the same time. Transforming the Mid-
dle East is an urgent priority, but it is not a purely American responsibility; it is a 
shared one. The U.S. should acknowledge that it will never have the ability to navi-
gate the regional political scene with the agility of a state like Turkey, and should 
encourage it to do the heavy lifting in terms of kickstarting economic integration 
and promoting a viable Islamic democratic model, a task it is superbly equipped 
to do and has already eagerly commenced. This will also have the salutary effect 
of placing the responsibility for transforming the Middle East into a secure, pros-
perous region that does not export extremism back where it always should have 
been – in the hands of the people themselves.
3 John J. Mearsheimer, “Pull Those Boots Off The Ground”, Newsweek, 31 December 2008.
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